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1. INTRODUCTION
The pharmaceutical industry has experienced unprecedented
changes over the past few decades. The advent of advanced
biotechnology has made possible unparalleled progress in the
development of new drugs and other medical treatments and
technologies. Given this rapid rate of technological advance,
regulatory agencies throughout the world have struggled to keep
pace and maintain their vigilant protection of public health and
safety. In recent years, many commentators, particularly those
with industry ties, have criticized regulators for overburdening the
pharmaceutical industry and hindering its ability to develop and
market new drugs. This pressure to reform has resulted in a
number of initiatives attempting to address these concerns without
crippling the ability of regulatory agencies to protect public safety.
One such initiative is the movement to harmonize
pharmaceutical regulations' across international jurisdictions. A
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1 The term pharmaceutical regulations as used here refers to administrative
regulations promulgated by governmental bodies that govern the research and
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
particularly promising exemplar of this movement has been the
International Conference on Harmonization of Technical
Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use
("ICH"), an attempt to improve harmonization between the three
dominant zones of new drug development: the United States,
Europe, and Japan. On November 15, 2003, representatives from
the pharmaceutical industries and regulatory agencies of these
three nations, as well as other interested parties, concluded a
meeting in Osaka, Japan, the sixth meeting of the ICH. One of the
major topics of discussion at this meeting was the status and future
of efforts to implement concrete ICH proposals for harmonization.
Of particular note is the effort to instate a standard form in all three
zones for the application for new drug marketing authorization,
the Common Technical Document ("CTD").
2
The ICH has been heralded as an exciting step in addressing
the challenges to the global pharmaceutical industry. It enjoys
considerable support from the industry as it can potentially reduce
the cost of obtaining new drug marketing authorizations in the
three most lucrative markets. However, as this Comment will
show, significant obstacles await the ICH and the harmonization
movement.
A useful comparison may be drawn to the experience of the
European Union3 ("EU") in their own efforts to harmonize new
drug development regulations within the European zone. The
development ("R&D"), sale, manufacturing, and use of pharmaceutical products.
Other equivalent terms used throughout this Comment include medicines
regulations, drug development regulations, and drug regulations. The scope of this
Comment does not include the differences between regulations governing new
drugs, new formulations or uses of previously approved drugs, generic versions
of previously approved drugs, or other classes of products produced by
pharmaceutical companies-including biologics, vaccines, blood products, etc.-
which are generally regulated by the same agencies, or in a similar manner, as
pharmaceutical drugs. Likewise, any use of the terms regulations or regulatory
agencies only refers to those relevant to the pharmaceutical industry, such as the
U.S. Food and Drug Administration ("FDA").
2 See discussion infra Section 4.2.
3 The European Union ("EU") was only formally established with the Treaty
of Maastricht in 1992, replacing the European Communities. See generally TREATY
ON EUROPEAN UNION, 1992, O.J. (C 191) 1 (1992) [hereinafter TREATY OF
MAASTRICHT] (establishing the European Union). Although the creation of the EU
certainly had momentous legal implications beyond those of the Communities,
the differences between the two bodies are not relevant to this Comment except as
discussed in Section 3. Thus this Comment refers to the acts and laws of the EU as
inclusive of those of the Communities.
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result of these efforts has been a strongly centralized process for
garnering marketing authorizations for new drugs with a great
deal of authority resting in a supranational body, the Committee
on Proprietary Medicinal Products ("CPMP"). Given a number of
factors, most notably political and economic concerns, this level of
centralization is perhaps unlikely to be the end result of the ICH.
However, the European experience indicates that less robust
regimes may ultimately prove unsuccessful.
At the core of any analysis of the ICH, or international
harmonization as a whole, must be the recognition that
pharmaceutical industry concerns are the predominant driving
force behind developments in this area. This is apparent from the
European experience as well as in the rationales typically given in
support of the ICH and international harmonization. A key
conclusion that must be drawn then is that mutual recognition,4 an
industry priority, is of vital importance to the harmonization effort.
With these facts in mind, the steps necessary for the success of the
ICH become clearer, and its future prospects are more easily
analyzed.
This Comment examines the future prospects of the ICH by
analyzing the harmonization process in Europe. Section 2 will
discuss the rationales behind the harmonization movement and the
important economic concerns underlying them. Section 3 then
scrutinizes the EU's experience with harmonization, which
culminated in the so-called decentralized and centralized
procedures instated in 1995. Section 4 then turns to the ICH,
analyzing the similarities and differences between the ICH and the
European experience, particularly the disparate national interests
of the three parties arising from political and economic concerns.
Section 5 discusses the conclusions that can be drawn from the
comparison of the ICH with the EU experience and the key
considerations in the future success of the ICH initiative. Lastly,
Section 6 offers a final summary perspective.
2. RATIONALES FOR INTERNATIONAL HARMONIZATION
The call for the international harmonization of pharmaceutical
regulations is a relatively recent phenomenon. As recently as 1985,
4 The terms mutual recognition and reciprocal approval are used more or less
interchangeably and refer to the granting of marketing authorization for a drug
based primarily on the positive assessment and marketing approval of the drug
by another nation (i.e. without a full-scale independent assessment of the drug).
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for example, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") did
not approve applications for marketing authorizations based solely
on research data gathered in clinical trials performed outside the
United States.5 The EU's groundbreaking efforts to harmonize
regulations within Europe really only began in the mid-1970s with
the introduction of the now-defunct CPMP procedure.6 The ICH
itself was only first convened in 1990.7 Considering that modern
pharmaceutical regulation began as early as the 1930s, and more
primitive regulation earlier still, harmonization is a relative
latecomer.
The clamor for harmonization of regulations across national
boundaries has become substantial with the increased
globalization of the industry, a trend that has gained momentum in
recent years.8 Mounting pressure for harmonization has also
coincided with rising costs for pharmaceutical research and
development ("R&D"), a situation many blame, at least partly, on
overregulation by national regulatory agencies such as the FDA.9
5 See New Drug and Antibiotic Regulations, 50 Fed. Reg. 7452, 7453 (Feb. 22,
1985) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 314.106) (explaining the basis for new FDA
regulations which, for the first time, permitted marketing authorizations based
solely on foreign clinical data).
6 See infra Section 3.2.
7 See infra Section 4.1.
S The last decade has been witness to considerable consolidation in the
pharmaceutical industry, resulting in domination by large multinational
corporations that span continents. For example, Swedish giant Pharmacia A.B.
and the Upjohn Company in the United States announced a merger in 1995 that
formed what was then the ninth largest drugmaker in the world. Louis Uchitelle,
Aiming at H.M.O. 's, Upjohn Agrees to $13 Billion Merger, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1995,
at Al. U.K. goliaths Glaxo Wellcome and SmithKline Beecham followed suit,
announcing in 2000 their intention to merge and become the world's largest drug
company, GlaxoSmithKline ("GSK"), run from a new operational base in the
United States. David Pilling, Glaxo, SB to Announce Deal Today, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 17,
2000, § 1, at 1. GSK now has manufacturing centers in thirty-seven countries and
conducts R&D in seven different countries. GlaxoSmithKline, About
GlaxoSmithKline, at http://www.gsk.com/about/about.htm (last visited Feb. 21,
2005). Other global mergers and acquisitions include: Astra (Swed.) merging with
Zeneca (U.K.) to form AstraZeneca (U.K.); Roche (Switz.) acquiring Syntex (U.S.),
then Boehringer Mannheim (F.R.G.), then partnering with Chugai Uapan); and
Hoechst (Ger.) with Marion Merrell Dow (U.S.), then Rhone-Poulenc Rorer (Fr.),
to form Aventis (Fr.). IMS Health, M&A Drives Decade of Change, Apr. 25, 2001, at
http://ww.ims-global.com/insight/news-story/0104/news-story_010425.htm.
9 See, e.g., MEIR STATMAN, COMPETITION IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY:
THE DECLINING PROFITABILITY OF DRUG INNOVATION 61-62 (1983) (contending that
the high costs of complying with FDA requirements prevents drug companies
from effectively conducting R&D).
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A variety of reasons have been offered by commentators to
promote the cause of harmonization. Among the most compelling
are: (1) lowering new drug development costs for pharmaceutical
companies; (2) reducing the time necessary to bring new drugs to
market-the so-called drug lag phenomenon- thereby providing
new treatments to the public faster; (3) increasing international
cooperation in pharmaceutical industry regulation, thus improving
regulatory efficiency and expertise; and (4) eliminating
unnecessary duplication of clinical trials on human populations,
thus minimizing risks to research subjects and assuaging ethical
concerns. As these rationales are examined in turn, the strong
influence of industry concerns will become apparent in each.
2.1. Lowering Drug Development Costs
Research and development in the pharmaceutical industry is
among the most costly of any industry, both in terms of gross
expenditures and percentage of operating budgets. The situation
in the United States is representative; in 2000, the pharmaceutical
industry was one of only five individual manufacturing industries
in the United States that spent $10 billion or more on R&D, a
distinction it shared with only two others in 1999.10 For the period
between 1997 and 2000, the pharmaceutical industry was the only
individual American manufacturing industry with average R&D
spending in double digits as a percentage of net sales, which was
also over three times the average for all U.S. manufacturers."
Attempts to quantify the average cost of bringing a new drug
to market have been somewhat controversial. Recent estimates for
the United States have suggested figures exceeding $800 million
per new drug.12 Although criticized, the Pharmaceutical Research
10 NAT'L Sci. FOUND., RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN INDUSTRY: 2000, at 34 tbl.
A-7 (2003), available at http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs/nsf03318/pdf/nsfO3318.pdf.
11 Id. at 74 tbl. A-20.
12 See, e.g., Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of
Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 166 (2003) (estimating the costs at
$802 million). But see PUBLIC CITIZEN, Rx R&D MYTHS: THE CASE AGAINST THE
DRUG INDUSTRY'S R&D "SCARE CARD" 3-4 (2001) (arguing that actual costs are
approximately $110 million), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/
ACFDC.PDF. The debate over how the cost of new drug R&D should be
calculated is an enormous topic unto itself. Groups like Public Citizen have
sharply criticized the DiMasi study, which has become a favorite of the
pharmaceutical industry. Id. Indeed, some of their criticisms may be valid, such
as the fact that the DiMasi estimate does not discount for taxes. On the other
hand, the Public Citizen calculation may be overly simplistic and not reflective of
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and Manufacturers of America ("PhRMA") published an estimate
in 2001 of $500 million per new drug, which seems to be something
of a median figure.13 Regardless of which figure is used, it is clear
that the costs are considerable. Furthermore, most estimates
indicate that these costs are only climbing.14
An important component of these costs is the high risk of new
drug development, which endangers return on investment. Given
that a pharmaceutical product typically cannot be sold without a
marketing authorization issued by the national regulatory
authority of the jurisdiction, failure to win approval essentially
scraps all of the company's investment in the development of that
product. Of every 5,000 medicines tested for potential sale in the
United States, for example, only five reach clinical trials and only
one receives marketing authorization.15 To compound these risks,
only three in every ten drugs receiving marketing authorization
result in sufficient revenue to recoup the average cost of R&D.16
true cost over time since, for example, it baldly refuses to factor in opportunity
cost of capital. Id. at 28.
13 PHARM. RESEARCH AND MFRS. OF AMERICA, PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
PROFILE 2000, at 2 (2001).
14 See Henry Grabowski, Pharmaceuticals: Politics, Policy, and Availability:
Patents and New Product Development in the Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology
Industries, 8 GEO. PUB. POL'Y REV. 7, 9-11 (2003) (calculating an annual increase in
R&D costs of 7.4% over inflation). Compare OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT,
PHARMACEUTICAL R&D: COSTS, RISKS, AND REWARDS 72 (1993) (estimating costs
between $140 million and $194 million per drug for drugs that entered clinical
trials from 1970 to 1982), available at http://www.wws.princeton.edu/cgi-
bin/byteserv.prl/-ota/diskl/1993/9336/9336.PDF, and Joseph A. DiMasi et al.,
Cost of Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 10 J. HEALTH ECON. 107, 107-09
(1991) (estimating $231 million per drug in the same period), with PHARM.
RESEARCH AND MFRS. OF AMERICA, supra note 13 (estimating $500 million in 2001),
and DiMasi et al., supra note 12, at 166 (estimating $802 million in 2000).
15 PHARM. RESEARCH AND MFRS. OF AMERICA, WHY Do PRESCRIPTION DRUGS
COST So MUCH 2-3 (2000), available at http://www.phrma.org/publications/
publications/brochure/questions/questions.pdf; see also Ken Flieger, Testing
Drugs in People, in AN FDA CONSUMER SPECIAL REPORT: FROM TEST TUBE TO PATIENT:
NEW DRUG DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, Jan. 1995, at 8 (reporting that only
twenty percent of drugs submitted to the FDA are eventually approved for
marketing). Clearly, the more dramatic cutoff occurs before submission to the
FDA with the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America
("PhRMA") reporting that only 0.1% of new drug formulations are ever submitted
to the agency. However, many of the decisions a company makes to not submit a
new drug to the FDA for review are based on its belief that the risk of the drug
not passing muster - due to extremely exacting regulatory standards - is too high
to justify the high costs of the FDA approval process.
16 PHARM. RESEARCH AND MFRS. OF AMERICA, supra note 13, at 2-3. See Henry
Grabowski et al., Returns on Research and Development for 1990s New Drug
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Due to these costs, the industry expends enormous effort to
pressure regulators and lawmakers for reform of regulations to
mitigate costs. 17 Harmonization promises a number of benefits for
industry in this area, mostly by eliminating duplicative efforts to
obtain marketing authorizations in multiple jurisdictions and
streamlining the overall approval process. As the other rationales
are examined, it will become clear that the industry's desire to
reduce costs forms an economic basis for virtually all of them.
2.2. Reducing Drug Lag
18
The time it takes for a new drug to go from inception to the
consumer is protracted due to the regulatory goals of ensuring
safety, quality, and efficacy. Reduction of drug review times has
thus been a focus of the pharmaceutical regulatory community in
recent years. In Europe, both national regulatory agencies and
supranational bodies overseeing the EU's harmonized regulatory
processes have labored to reduce drug review times.19 The United
States has followed suit, making faster drug approvals a priority.
20
The need for such reform was clear. In the United States, for
example, a new drug developed in the early 1990s would take the
better part of a decade before reaching market and could take as
long as twenty years.2 1
Introductions, 20 PHARMACOECONOMIcS 11, 22-23 (3d Supp. 2002) (graphing
distributions of returns compared with research and development costs).
17 A recent study found that the U.S. pharmaceutical and healthcare
industries spent $237 million on lobbying efforts in 2000 alone. Steven H. Landers
& Ashwini R. Sehgal, Health Care Lobbying in the United States, 116 AM. J. MED. 474,
474-75 (2004). This constituted 15% of the total amount spent on federal lobbying
in the United States, the largest amount of any industry. Id. Of this figure, the
largest component was the expenditure of $96 million by pharmaceutical and
health product companies. Id. at 475.
18 The "drug lag" phenomenon has been the subject of a great deal of
scholarship. Essentially, the term refers to the lag between development of a new
drug and its delivery to market, namely the time required to obtain marketing
approval from regulatory authorities. See, e.g., BARUCH A. BRODY, ETHICAL ISSUES
IN DRUG TESTING, APPROVAL, AND PRICING: THE CLOT-DISSOLVING DRUGS 164-65
(1995); Sam Peltzman, An Evaluation of Consumer Protection Legislation: The 1962
Drug Amendments, 81 J. POL. ECON. 1049 (1973) (finding a net negative impact on
consumers as a result of the 1962 drug amendments).
19 See discussion infra Section 3.
20 See BILL CLINTON & AL GORE, REINVENTING REGULATION OF DRUGS AND
MEDICAL DEVICES 2-5 (1995) (declaring that shortening review times for new drugs
and medical devices, as well as eliminating "unnecessary regulation," would be
priorities in reforming FDA regulations).
21 See Flieger, supra note 15, at 10 (breaking down the time required for each
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Some benefits of a quick turnaround in approving drugs are
obvious. First and foremost, reducing the delay permits the more
rapid supply of new drugs to the patients who need them. This
expedited turnaround would minimize pain and suffering and
even save lives if the condition to be treated is terminal.
Furthermore, earlier availability of drugs could potentially lower
health care costs.22 These benefits are the ones most often cited by
government officials and regulators in recent years to justify efforts
to reduce domestic drug approval times.23  Proponents of
harmonization argue that better meshing regulatory systems across
borders would hasten the availability of drugs internationally in
much the same way. This is a logical proposition; harmonization
would reduce drug approval time in the aggregate if marketing
authorizations must be sought from multiple nations.
Other benefits to reducing drug lag are not quite as obvious but
may in fact be more influential in the push for harmonization. An
important example lies at the nexus between drug approval times
and patent rights. Many drugs, particularly cutting-edge
medicines, are granted patent protection even before entering the
regulatory approval process. 24 Every day spent attempting to
obtain marketing authorization for a drug is a day not spent
stage of drug development in the United States from inception through the FDA
approval process); see also DiMasi et al., supra note 12, at 164-66 (estimating an
average of 90.3 months from the start of clinical testing until marketing approval
and 52.0 months for preclinical development, a total of 142.3 months or nearly
twelve years).
22 U.S. healthcare costs in 2000 reached an estimated $1.3 trillion, nearly 15%
of GDP. American Health Care Is the Best in the World-If You Can Get It,
ECONOMIST, Sept. 28, 2000. Of this amount, $112 billion comes from prescription
drug expenditures alone, a figure growing at 10% per annum. Id. Faster drug
approvals could potentially lower these costs by lowering development costs for
manufacturers and spurring competition.
23 For example:
Millions of Americans are suffering from diseases that may be curable or
at least manageable as a result of technologies in development now.
From a public health standpoint, making it simpler and more
straightforward to translate all these investments into valuable products
can have a substantial positive impact on the health of the nation, and
can improve access to needed care as well.
FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, STRATEGIC ACTION PLAN: PROTECTING AND
ADVANCING AMERICA'S HEALTH 11 (2003).
24 Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on
the Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187, 192 (1999); Grabowski,
supra note 14, at 11.
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reaping commercial gain from its sale, effectively cutting the term
of the patent.25 Therefore, reduced drug lag can substantially
increase the returns on investment for a pharmaceutical company,
and harmonization multiplies this effect for any drug sold in
multiple markets internationally. Clearly, this is another appealing
consequence of reduced approval times for the industry.
2.3. Increasing Cooperation Among Regulatory Agencies
One tremendous advantage of increased cooperation and
harmonization between regulatory agencies worldwide would
clearly be heightened efficiency of the review process. In the case
of the participating nations of the ICH, for example, a fully
harmonized process would allow regulators in the United States,
Europe, and Japan to work in concert to minimize needless
duplication, more efficiently allocate resources, and streamline the
review process. As compared to the current regime in which three
separate agencies-and possibly more given the complex
multinational system in place in Europe26-evaluate each drug
separately, the advantages in efficiency are obvious.
25 Grabowski, supra note 14, at 11. Since patents grant a limited monopoly on
the patented technologies, shorter effective patent life ("EPL") cuts into the most
lucrative portion of a drug's commercial lifetime. The average EPL of
pharmaceutical patents for drugs developed in the 1990s was roughly twelve
years, significantly less than the original term of twenty years. Id. at 12. The
losses incurred from failing to take advantage of a portion of the term of a
pharmaceutical patent can be considerable. Based on data from the 1990s, one
study reported mean worldwide sales rising rapidly from just under $100 million
per year at market introduction to a peak of over $450 million per year before
patent expiry-namely the introduction of competition- decreases sales as
market share is lost and price competition has its effect. Grabowski et al., supra
note 16, at 17, fig.3. For the most lucrative drugs, peak sales exceeded $2.5 billion
per year worldwide prior to patent expiry. Id. at 17-18, figs.2, 4.
In order to mitigate this patent limiting effect, all three participating zones of
the International Conference on Harmonization of Technical Requirements for
Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use ("ICH") have passed various
legislation to restore some patent protection by artificially extending patent life.
See, e.g., Drug Price Competition and Patent Restoration Act, 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2004)
(permitting the extension of patents that have been effectively reduced by
regulatory review periods, but by no more than five years and to a maximum of
fourteen years after the date of approval). However, there have been allegations
that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") has been far from liberal in
granting such extensions. See Ronald L. Desrosiers, Note, The Drug Patent Term:
Longtime Battleground in the Control of Health Care Costs, 24 NEw ENG. L. REV. 115,
141 (1989) (stating that as of 1988, the PTO had only granted the full extension
allowed by law in two out of ninety cases).
26 See discussion infra Section 3.2.
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A more subtle but crucial aspect of increased cooperation is the
advantage of pooling intellectual resources in a harmonized
approach. One of the greatest challenges for any agency regulating
a highly technical field is maintaining a high enough level of
scientific expertise within the agency in order to properly evaluate
state-of-the-art technology. This problem is an acute one for
agencies regulating the pharmaceutical industry. Many have
established special scientific advisory committees, such as the
United Kingdom's Committee on Safety of Medicines ("CSM") or
Sweden's Board of Drugs ("BOD"), whose expertise is consulted
on applications for marketing approval, particularly those for new
drugs.27 The FDA established both the Center for Drug Evaluation
and Research ("CDER") and the Center for Biologics Evaluation
and Research ("CBER") to serve this function in the United States.28
Japan's equivalent body is the National Institute of Health Sciences
("NIHS').29
Successful harmonization as envisioned by the ICH could
certainly assist the participating regulatory agencies by increasing
communication and the sharing of knowledge between regulators
as well as their scientific advisors. By pooling these intellectual
resources, regulators could improve the speed and expertise with
which they assess the merits of drug marketing applications. They
would also be better equipped to offer guidance to companies at all
stages of the process. ,.
While obviously beneficial to regulators, these considerations
present advantages to the industry as well. Inefficiency in agency
27 See JOHN ABRAHAM & GRAHAM LEWIS, REGULATING MEDICINES IN EUROPE 60-
71 (2000) (describing the role of scientific advisory bodies in the British and
Swedish regulatory systems).
28 See FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, IMPROVING PUBLIC HEALTH:
PROMOTING SAFE AND EFFECTIVE DRUG USE (2003) (describing the responsibilities of
the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research ("CDER"), including expert
scientific analysis of all new drugs), at http://www.fda.gov/opacom/factsheets/
justthefacts/3cder.pdf; FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, CBER- ABOUT Us (2003)
("[R]eview of new biological products [by the Center for Biologics Evaluation and
Research ("CBER")] ... requires evaluating scientific and clinical data submitted
by manufacturers to determine whether the product meets CBER's standards for
approval."), available at http://www.fda.gov/cber/about.htm. Simply put,
chemically synthesized pharmaceuticals fall under the purview of CDER while
biologics, medicinal products derived from living sources, are governed by CBER.
29 See NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH SCI., MISSION STATEMENT (describing the purpose
of the NIHS, including "evaluating the quality, efficacy and safety of... food,
drugs, and agricultural chemicals"), available at http://www.nihs.go.jp/
aboutnihs/nihs-pamphlet/pl.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
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action has been a prime complaint of the industry for years. In
addition, greater scientific expertise and guidance from regulatory
agencies would certainly be welcomed by the pharmaceutical
industry as it would introduce greater certainty in what is now a
very risky enterprise.30
2.4. Eliminating Unnecessarily Duplicative Clinical Trials
It is undisputed scientific fact that sound research into new
medicines must include extensive clinical trials on human
populations. In fact, such trials are required to some degree under
virtually all modern regulatory schemes controlling drugs and
medicinal products worldwide.
31
However, it is clear that clinical trials pose risks for the research
subjects involved, 32 which is why they are heavily regulated.33
Eliminating unnecessarily duplicative trials is thus an ethical
imperative.34 Recent ethical controversies arising from clinical
30 See discussion supra Section 2.1 (noting the perils and costs of the FDA
approval process).
31 See, e.g., Applications for FDA Approval to Market a New Drug, 21 C.F.R.
§ 314.50 (2003) (requiring results of clinical trials in applications for FDA
approval); Food and Drug Regulations Under the Food and Drugs Act, ch. 870,
C.R.C. § C.08.002(2)(g)-(h) (2004) (Can.) (requiring test results to prove safety and
"clinical effectiveness" in new drug submissions); Medicines Regulations (1971) SI
973, sched. I, pt. I, 27 (Eng.) (requiring reports of all studies "relevant to the
assessment of the safety, quality or efficacy of the medicinal product" in
applications for a license).
32 The dangers faced by clinical trial participants have been the subject of
intense scrutiny for much of the last century. The topic was thrust to the forefront
following World War II, as evidence of unethical human experimentation
performed by Nazi doctors on unwilling Jews was uncovered. BARUCH A. BRODY,
THE ETHICS OF BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH 31-32 (1998). The exposure of the forty-year
U.S. Public Health Service ("PHS") study of the long-term effects of syphilis in
poor African American men- the so-called Tuskegee syphilis study-caused a
similar stir. See id. at 33 (discussing the ethics of the Tuskegee syphilis study). See
generally JAMES H. JONES, BAD BLOOD: THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS EXPERIMENT (new and
expanded ed. 1993) (recounting in detail the circumstances and impact of the
Tuskegee syphilis study). Other such incidents included the Halushka case in
Canada and the Auckland cervical cancer studies in New Zealand. See BRODY,
supra, at 33 (discussing incidents of human experimentation gone awry outside
the United States).
33 See, e.g., Council Directive 2001/20/EC, 2001 O.J. (L 121) 34 (detailing
requirements for EU clinical trials regulation), available at http://europa.eu.int/
eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2001/1j21/l_12120010501enOO340044.pdf; The Medical
Products Agency's Provisions and Guidelines on Clinical Trials of Medicinal
Products for Human Use, LVFS 2003:6 (Swed.) (implementing EU requirements in
Sweden), available at http://www.mpa.se/eng/lvfse/LVFSe_2003-6.shtml.
34 For a detailed discussion of the ethical considerations of human clinical
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research on new medicines, particularly those conducted in
developing nations,35  have emphasized the importance of
trials, see BRODY, supra note 32, at 139-60 and J.K. MASON & R.A. MCCALL SMITH,
LAW AND MEDICAL ETHICS 351-68 (4th ed. 1994).
One of the most contentious areas in the debate on international medical
research ethics is that of informed consent. Although this issue is well
documented in the domestic tort law field, the scientific profession continues to
wrestle with it as research becomes increasingly complex and international in
scope. Two aspects of the issue are of particular importance to the topic of
international medicines regulation: (1) what constitutes informed consent when
uneducated, unsophisticated people are the subjects of a clinical trial; and (2)
whether research subjects are truly able to make a voluntary choice to participate
when their socioeconomic condition prevents them from access to any alternative
form of treatment. These concerns manifest themselves notably in the case of
research done in developing nations. For an in-depth discussion of the issue of
informed consent in an international context, see BRODY, supra note 32, at 43-48
and MASON & MCCALL SMITH, supra, at 359-62.
If international regulatory regimes are to move toward greater acceptance of
foreign clinical data, the parameters of such acceptance must be adequately
defined in order to prevent frustration of regulatory goals, namely the protection
of research subjects. The limited nature of the harmonization espoused by the
ICH - involvement of only developed nations - could allow for a partition along
the lines of ICH membership, perhaps providing for heightened deference to
clinical studies performed in ICH zones rather than in other locales. Although not
examined in detail in this Comment, the ICH has already begun to address the
issue of informed consent along with various other ethical issues. See EUROPEAN
AGENCY FOR THE EVALUATION OF MEDICINAL PRODUCTS, NOTE FOR GUIDANCE ON
GOOD CLINICAL PRACTICE, CPMP/ICH/135/95 at 1 (May 1, 1996) ("[The ICH
Good Clinical Practice Guideline] is an international ethical and scientific quality
standard for designing, conducting, recording and reporting trials that involve the
participation of human subjects . . . a unified standard for [ICH participating
nations] .... ") [hereinafter GCP GUIDELINE], available at http://www.emea.eu.int/
pdfs/human/ich/01359sen.pdf.
Another ethical issue of particular relevance to international medicines
regulation is that of independent review of clinical trial protocols. In most
developed nations, such as those participating in the ICH, clinical trials are
required to undergo independent evaluation by institutional review boards
("IRBs"), who are responsible to the government to some extent. See, e.g., IND
Content and Format, 21 C.F.R. § 312.23(a)(1)(iv) (2002) (requiring the approval
and monitoring of an IRB for FDA approval of clinical trials); Institutional Review
Boards, 21 C.F.R. §§ 56.101-.115 (2005) (outlining the form, function, and
operations of IRBs). Obviously this type of review, as well as enforcement of the
boards' authority, is much more difficult when the trials are performed abroad.
As with informed consent, the ICH has spoken on this issue. See GCP GUIDELINE,
supra, Section 3 (setting the. requirements for and functions of IRBs for ICH
nations). However, in the future it could be feasible to take further steps, perhaps
including direct cooperation between IRBs in ICH nations to expand the
boundaries of their oversight.
35 The most prominent recent controversy involved a series of clinical trials
performed primarily in sub-Saharan Africa on the relative effectiveness of
treatment regimens for Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome ("AIDS")
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol26/iss1/3
2005] DRUG REGULATIONS HARMONIZATION
adequately addressing clinical trials in any international regulatory
regime. 36  Harmonization advocates argue that facilitation of
compared to an established regimen known as AIDS Clinical Trials Group Study
076 ("ACTG 076"). ACTG 076 was a treatment regimen using the drug
zidovudine, better known as azidothymidine or AZT, to reduce the risk of
perinatal transmission of AIDS. These studies, mostly funded by various national
governments including the United States (through the National Institutes of
Health ("NIH") or the Centers for Disease Control ("CDC")), raised a host of
ethical issues regarding international clinical research, particularly if performed in
developing nations. For an in-depth and highly publicized discussion of these
issues, see Peter Lurie & Sidney M. Wolfe, Unethical Trials of Interventions to Reduce
Perinatal Transmission of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus in Developing Countries,
337 NEw ENG. J. MED. 853 (1997), reprinted in AIDS: SOCIETY, ETHICS AND LAW 403
(Udo Schtiklenk ed., 2001) [hereinafter Schtiklenk, AIDS]; Harold Varmus &
David Satcher, Ethical Complexities of Conducting Research in Developing Countries,
337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1003 (1997), reprinted in Schdklenk, AIDS; supra, at 407;
George J. Annas & Michael A. Grodin, Human Rights and Maternal-Fetal HIV
Transmission Prevention Trials in Africa, 88 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 560 (1998), reprinted
in Schfiklenk, AIDS, supra, at 411; Robert J. Levine, The "Best Proven Therapeutic
Method" Standard in Clinical Trials in Technologically Developing Countries, 20 IRB: A
REVIEW OF HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH 5 (1998), reprinted in Schiiklenk, AIDS, supra,
at 415; and also see Peter Lurie et al., Ethical, Behavioral, and Social Aspects of HIV
Vaccine Trials in Developing Countries, 271 JAMA 295 (1994), reprinted in Schtiklenk,
AIDS, supra, at 421.
36 In response to the many ethical crises that have erupted -beginning with
the conduct of Nazi researchers during World War II -numerous attempts have
been made to codify an international standard for medical research ethics. The
first was the Nuremberg Code, a set of ten ethical principles that were a part of
the judgment of the tribunal against Nazi scientists in 1947. See GEORGE J. ANNAS
& MICHAEL A. GRODIN, THE NAzI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE: HUMAN
RIGHT's IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION 2 (1992). The Nuremberg Code asserted as
fundamental necessities in human research: (1) "voluntary [informed] consent,"
(2) minimization of risks for research subjects, and (3) that the societal benefits
outweigh the risks. See id. at 2, paras. 1-2, 4-7. These tenets were embraced by the
World Medical Association ("WMA") in the highly influential Declaration of
Helsinki, which has been revised on several occasions, most recently in 2002. See
Declaration of Helsinki, WMA Doc. 17.C (2004) (originally adopted in 1964 and
amended in 1975, 1983, 1989, 1996, and 2000), available at http://www.wma.net/e
/policy/pdf/17c.pdf. In addition, the Declaration of Helsinki espouses the use of
IRBs, addresses the issue of incompetent subjects incapable of providing informed
consent, and demands that the "best current" treatments be provided to all
research subjects, including any receiving a placebo, at the conclusion of the
study. Id. paras. 13, 24-26, 30. The 2002 revision sought to expound on the
WMA's position on the use of placebo controls. See id. para. 29, n.1 (approving of
the use of placebo controls but only with "extreme care"); cf. sources cited supra
note 35 (discussing the ethical considerations of the use of placebo controls in
ACTG 076 trials in Africa). Another notable attempt at an international research
ethics code is that published by the Council for International Organizations of
Medical Sciences ("CIOMS") in conjunction with the World Health Organization
("WHO"). See generally CIOMS/WHO, INTERNATIONAL ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR
BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS (2002) (providing extensive
guidelines regarding clinical research practices based on the principles of the
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mutual acceptance of clinical data would eliminate unnecessary
clinical studies, thus reducing these ethical concerns. This has been
a major focus of the ICH to date, moving toward a mutual
acceptance system that minimizes the need for companies to repeat
clinical trials in each jurisdiction in which they intend to market
their products.
37
Unfortunately, scientific concerns do limit the extent to which
such harmonization can occur. Given the different demographics
of the United States, Europe, and Japan, the applicability of clinical
data from one zone to predicting safety and/or efficacy in another
may be suspect. Differing genetic or other biologically relevant
characteristics of a population can have an impact on a drug's
effect.38 Thus, while eliminating duplicative clinical trials is a
worthwhile goal for harmonization efforts as a rule, some region-
specific clinical testing may remain necessary.
These scientific limitations aside, the advantages of a lesser
need for repetitive clinical trials are clear for the industry. Clinical
trials are now the most costly expenses of pharmaceutical R&D
39
precisely because of the exacting standards imposed on them by
regulatory authorities.40 Furthermore, given the inherent risks
involved in clinical trials of new medicines, excessive clinical
testing could merely increase the risk of tort liability for injuries
Declaration of Helsinki with notable attention to issues of research conducted in
developing nations), available at http://www.cioms.ch/frameguidelinesnov
_2002.htm. The ICH GCP Guideline is the offspring of these various codes. For
another discussion of these standards and their international legal implications,
see David P. Fidler, "Geographical Morality" Revisited: International Relations,
International Law, and the Controversy over Placebo-Controlled HIV Clinical Trials in
Developing Countries, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 299 (2001).
37 See GCP GUIDELINE, supra note 34, at 1 ("The objective of this ICH GCP
Guideline is to... facilitate the mutual acceptance of clinical data by the regulatory
authorities in [ICH nations].") (emphasis added).
However, pre-ICH regulations did provide some opportunities for this sort of
harmonization. See, e.g., New Drug and Antibiotic Regulations, supra note 5
(regarding the enactment of U.S. regulations permitting marketing authorizations
based solely on foreign clinical data).
38 Cf. Lurie & Wolf, supra note 35, at 296 ("[T]he possible existence of genetic,
environmental, or nutritional cofactors for [Human Immunodeficiency Virus
("HIV")] infection that may vary from country to country require that phase III
[clinical] trials be conducted in industrialized and developing nations.").
39 See DiMasi et al., supra note 12, at 166-68, fig.2 (calculating the average
capitalized cost per new drug of the clinical trial period at $467 million, or 58.2%
of the total cost per drug).
40 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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caused to research subjects.41 Therefore, the interests of industry
are sure to be served if the number of clinical trials required is
decreased.
3. HISTORY OF EUROPEAN HARMONIZATION
The EU is a loose confederation of Member States, each
maintaining their basic sovereignty while vesting central EU
bodies with enumerated authority to make decisions binding on all
Member States. 42 This organizational structure has resulted in a
dual level system of regulation in many areas, including medicines
regulation. First, each Member State retains a national regulatory
agency, whose approval is still technically necessary for access to
that nation's markets.43 Second, at the supranational level, the
European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products
("EMEA") and the CPMP have evolved from the harmonization
movement to address transnational regulatory issues.44  An
understanding of both levels is necessary to comprehend the issues
faced by the EU in its push toward harmonization.
3.1. National Regulation in Europe
While legislation in European nations governing the
development and sale of pharmaceutical drugs existed before the
twentieth century, modern regulation in the form of national
regulatory agencies emerged just prior to World War II in
Scandinavia. The most notable such agency was the Department of
Drugs ("SLA") of the National Board of Health and Welfare
("NBHW") formed by Sweden in 1935.45 Swedish drug laws, even
as early as the 1930s, were ahead of their time as they required the
industry to demonstrate safety and efficacy of new drugs prior to
41 See LeRoy Walters, Ethical Issues in the Prevention and Treatment of HIV
Infection and AIDS, 239 ScI. 597, 602 (1988) ("[T]he risk of litigation for research-
related injury might be reduced in a non-U.S. setting [such as Africa].").
42 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, How THE EUROPEAN UNION WORKS 3-4 (2003),
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/publications/booklets/eu-documenta
tion/06/en.pdf.
43 See infra Section 3.1 (examining national-level medicines regulation in
European countries).
44 See infra Section 3.2 (examining medicines regulation at the EU level).
45 Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Germany have had what are among the
most influential national regulatory agencies in Europe for much of the twentieth
century. Thus the history of medicines regulation in these three nations is
discussed here as representative of the rest of Europe.
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marketing approval by the SLA.46 The SLA remained the central
regulatory authority in Sweden until 1990 with the formation of
the Medical Products Agency ("MPA").47 One of the major early
accomplishments of the MPA in the early 1990s was the drastic
reduction of review times, a response to pressure from industry.
48
The MPA is considered among the agencies most receptive to
industry concerns in Europe.49
46 See M.N.G. DUKES, THE EFFEcTs OF DRUG REGULATION 9 (1985) (noting that
the inclusion of efficacy 'criteria in Norwegian and Swedish pharmaceutical
regulations predated those of most nations by roughly thirty years). Most nations
at this point were predominantly concerned with product quality, namely that a
product was what the manufacturer said it was. Sweden and Norway were the
first countries in Europe to require that a product do what the manufacturer
claimed it did. Id.
47 ABRAHAM & LEWIS, supra note 27, at 68.
From the 1960s until 1981, the final authority on marketing approval for new
drugs resided with the Board of Drugs ("BOD") though the Department of Drugs
("SLA") remained the agency responsible for evaluating new drug applications.
The SLA would provide its analysis of new drug applications along with a
recommendation for approval (or rejection) to the BOD, which would render the
final decision to the applicant. The SLA regained its full authority in 1981, and the
BOD has since been relegated to the scientific advisory role. The Medical
Products Agency ("MPA") is notably different than the SLA in that it is now
largely independent from the parent Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, in day-
to-day operations, in a manner similar to the relationship between the FDA and
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS"). Id. at 55-56, 68.
The MPA, and the SLA before it, has historically enforced its authority more
easily compared to other nations' agencies given that all sales of medicines in
Sweden are done through the state pharmacy company, Apoteksbolaget, since
1961. Id. at 57.
48 Id. at 68. See generally discussion supra Section 2.2 (discussing the issue of
drug lag and review times).
49 Among the reasons why the MPA is seen as so closely tied to industry is
the agency's heavy dependence on fees, a condition prevalent in many of
Europe's national regulatory agencies. See infra Section 3.3. The MPA charges
companies fees for its services in reviewing applications for marketing approval,
rendering administrative guidance, overseeing clinical trial protocols, etc., as well
as annual fees after authorizations have been granted. Medical Products Agency's
Provisions and Guidelines on the Payment of Application and Annual Fees for
Medicinal Products, LVFS 1995:12 (Swed.). This pecuniary link between the MPA
and the industry gives pharmaceutical companies a powerful influence due to the
nature of the EU's current mutual recognition system of supranational medicines
regulation. The MPA and other national agencies compete with each other to
serve as the agency of first approval, namely the agency that conducts the primary
review of a given new drug application. See infra Sections 3.2-3. Since primary
review permits the charging of larger fees, inter-agency competition arguably
results in companies having a good deal of leverage, particularly given the
dominance of a handful of monolithic multinational corporations in the industry.
The MPA could thus understandably be reluctant to unnecessarily delay an
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In 1943, the Nazi government in Germany banned the sale of
any drugs not explicitly approved for sale by the government.50 Its
successor, the government of the Federal Republic of Germany,
upheld the ban until it was ruled unconstitutional by the German
Constitutional Court in 1959.51 The original justification for the ban
given by the Nazi government was to protect national security,
while the post-war government claimed the maintenance of the
ban was due to its goal of protecting the public from unnecessary
or dangerous drugs.52 Shortly after the lifting of the ban, the
German Parliament (Bundestag) passed the German Drug Law
(Arzneitmittelgesetz, "AMG") of 1961, which established the
Federal Health Ministry (Bundesgesundheitsamt, "BGA") as the
national regulatory authority over the pharmaceutical industry.53
AMG 1976 expanded the reporting requirements of pharmaceutical
companies, mandated extensive drug testin, and directed the
BGA to evaluate drugs basecf on assessments of safety and
application submitted by a company like Pfizer, for example, since doing so could
discourage the company from selecting the agency for its many future
applications. (However, this is not to say that the MPA is not still dedicated to
ensuring the public health and safety of the Swedish people.)
The inter-agency competition phenomenon in European drug regulation in
some ways resembles interstate competition in attracting corporate charters in the
United States. Some allege that Delaware's dependence on its domination of the
corporate charter "market" has resulted in a pro-corporate regulatory scheme in
the state, the "race to the bottom" theory. See, e.g., Guhan Subramanian, The
Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on Incorporation Choice: Evidence on the "Race"
Debate and Antitakeover Overreaching, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1795 (2002) (describing
how states' eagerness to attract more incorporations through enacting
antitakeover statutes results in a "race to the bottom").
50 Arthur A. Daemmrich, Regulatory Laws and Political Culture in the U.S. and
Germany, in REGULATION OF THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 11, 17-18 (John
Abraham & Helen Lawton Smith eds., 2003).
51 Id. at 19-20, 26.
52 Id. at 18-19.
53 Gesetz tiber den Verkehr mit Arzneimitteln (Arzneimittelgesetz), v.
16.5.1961 (BGB1. I S.533) [hereinafter AMG 1961]; see also ABRAHAM & LEWIS, supra
note 27, at 50 (outlining the major points of AMG 1961). AMG 1961 was
strengthened in 1964 following the thalidomide scandal, a pivotal event in the
development of modem drug regulation. See Daemmrich, supra note 50, at 28-29
(discussing the aftermath of AMG 1961). However, these amendments were
deemed inadequate in the prevailing political climate of the time, and the BGA's
close ties to the industry were lambasted as a more robust regulatory system was
put into place. Id. Different politics govern the direction of medicines regulation
today, but the importance of politics in the issues of this area of law is a key
consideration when contemplating its future. See discussion infra Section 4.
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efficacy.54 The BGA was disbanded in 1994, and its regulatory
duties over medicines were given to the new Federal Institute for
Medicinal Products and Devices (Bundesinstitut fur Arzneimittel
und Medizinprodukte, "BfArM"), 5 a move welcomed by the
industry. Among the reasons given for the BGA's dissolution was
the high dissatisfaction with the agency's lengthy review times.
56
The BfArM has dramatically reduced review times and has been
credited with repairing relations between the government and the
industry.57
The first modern British regulatory "agency" was the
Committee on Safety of Drugs ("CSD"), an advisory body that was
established in response to the thalidomide disaster in 1961.58
Parliament followed up with the Medicines Act of 1968.59 Under
the new regime, the final decision to approve or reject a new drug
was to be made by a national licensing authority with the advice of
the Committee on Safety of Medicines ("CSM"),60 which essentially
replaced the CSD. Pharmaceutical companies were required to
apply for approval (called certificates) for clinical trials, and their
54 Gesetzes zur Neuordnung des Arzneimittelrechts (Arzneimittelgesetz), v.
24.8.1976 (BGBl. I S.2445) [hereinafter AMG 19761. Prior to AMG 1976, standards
for evaluating safety and efficacy were largely vague, not legally binding, and did
not apply to some classes of drugs. AMG 1976 specified criteria to be used in
evaluating safety and efficacy, and the Federal Health Ministry ("BGA")
promulgated regulations under AMG 1976 specifying required testing regimes.
ABRAHAM & LEWIS, supra note 27, at 55. Thus AMG 1976 could be said to be the
true birth of modem medicines regulation in Germany.
55 See ABRAHAM & LEWIS, supra note 27, at 73-74 (describing the circumstances
surrounding the founding of the Federal Institute for Medicinal Products and
Devices ("BfArM")).
56 Id.; see also Daemmrich, supra note 50, at 38 (chronicling the effect of the
pharmaceutical industry's complaints about the "approval jam" caused by slow
approval times).
57 ABRAHAM& LEWIS, supra note 27, at 74-76. Although BfArM has been said
to be warm to industry concerns, it retains an important distinction from its
counterparts in other European nations such as Sweden or the U.K. Although
BfArM's budget includes substantial revenue from fees, government funds still
constitute the majority of the agency's funding. Id. at 74.
58 Id. at 50-51.
59 See Medicines Act, 1968, c. 67 (Eng.). The Medicines Act of 1968 remains
the primary legislative basis for medicines regulation in the U.K. although large
portions of it were superceded by EU measures in 1995.
60 See Medicines Act, 1968, c. 67, pt. I, §§ 4(3)(a), 20(4) (Eng.) (providing for
the establishment of a committee to give the Licensing Authority "advice with
respect to safety, quality or efficacy..." and requiring the Licensing Authority to
consult this committee before rejecting a drug on those grounds); see also
ABRAHAM & LEWIS, supra note 27, at 53-54 (describing the role of the CSM).
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application for licenses (i.e. marketing authorizations) had to
satisfactorily address safety and efficacy issues.61 However, given
the initially permissive nature of regulatory review, the
government sought to toughen regulations in the 1970s, even going
so far as to review thousands of licenses and recommend the
revocation of some of them.62 This trend reversed in the 1980s with
the election of the Conservative Thatcher government. After
instituting an industry-friendly review of regulations, the Thatcher
government sacked the de facto Licensing Authority, the
Medicines Division of the Department of Health, in 1989 and
replaced it with the Medicines Control Agency ("MCA").63 The
pro-industry focus of the MCA was immediately evident.
Reduction of review times was a major focus of the new agency,
and the MCA sought more consultation with the industry. 64
Perhaps even more controversial was the move to an entirely fee-
based budget; the MCA has been financially self-sufficient since
1991, supporting itself entirely by fees charged to companies
seeking MCA review of new products and other MCA services.65
Other European nations have had experiences similar to those
of Sweden, Germany, and the United Kingdom, namely the
establishment and strengthening of national regulation in response
to growing concerns about public safety-most notably the
thalidomide crisis of 1961 -followed by a more recent trend to
ameliorate industry concerns over costly, lengthy regulatory
review. It is this latter trend that has more significantly shaped the
harmonization efforts of the EU.
61 Medicines Act, 1968, c. 67, § 19 (Eng.).
62 See T. B. Binns, The Committee on Review of Medicines, 281 BRr. MED. J. 1614,
1614-15 (1980) (discussing the British government's review of pharmaceutical
licenses begun in 1975).
63 ABRAHAM & LEWIS, supra note 27, at 61-63. The Conservative Party (the
"Tories") has historically been known as the pro-business party in the United
Kingdom, as opposed to the Labour Party.
64 See Peter Marsh, Scientists Turn Up Volume Control for Pharmaceuticals Tests,
FIN. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1990, § 1, at 8 (examining the Medicines Control Agency's
("MCA") focus on accelerating review of new medicines).
65 ABRAHAM & LEwIs, supra note 27, at 65. -
The move to finance pharmaceutical regulation partially or entirely by
charging user fees has become increasingly common throughout Europe. It is an
important development that is more fully discussed later in Section 3.3. See also
discussion supra note 49 (discussing Sweden's usage of fees in medicines
regulation).
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3.2. Supranational Regulation in Europe and Harmonization
Harmonization of regulations within the European zone has
been on the European agenda since the 1960s, but the movement
remained barely even embryonic until the 1970s. The first measure
addressing the regulation of drug development occurred in 1965
with Council Directive 65/65/EEC, which declared that no
pharmaceutical drug could be marketed in a Member State unless
a marketing authorization was first obtained from that Member
State's regulatory authority. 66 The measure also set out, in general
terms, what sort of information applicants needed to provide to
obtain an authorization. 67  This latter aspect of Directive
65/65/EEC was amplified a decade later by Council Directive
75/318/EEC, which laid out in greater detail the standards and
protocols applicable to pharmaceutical testing required before
applying for authorization. 68
The Council's very next Directive, 75/319/EEC, represented
the most concrete step yet toward harmonization within the
European zone. Most importantly, the measure established the
CPMP as a central body intended to facilitate harmonization of
medicines regulation.69 It also provided for the first EU-wide
66 Council Directive 65/65/EEC, art. 3, 1965-1966 O.J. SPEC. ED. 24
[hereinafter Directive 65/65/EEC]. This provision, however, hardly represented
much of an advancement of harmonization. As discussed in Section 3.1, nations
had begun to put modem regulatory systems into place to govern drugs on a
national level by this time. Since no European Community body, nor other such
body, had ever addressed drug regulation before, Directive 65/65/EEC arguably
amounted to a mere recognition of the status quo, or perhaps the mere
acknowledgment of developments already well-underway in most European
nations.
67 Id. art. 4. Notably, Directive 65/65/EEC required that results of "physico-
chemical, biological or microbiological ... pharmacological and toxicological
tests" as well as results of "clinical trials" be submitted when applying for a
nation's marketing authorization. Id. Product quality, safety, and efficacy were
all named as requirements for marketable drugs. Id. art. 5. However, little detail
was provided, and a great deal of discretion was clearly left to each national
authority.
68 Council Directive 75/318/EEC, Annex, 1975 O.J. (L 147) 1 [hereinafter
Directive 75/318/EEC]. These provisions considerably fleshed out the
requirements for scientific data that were mentioned in Directive 65/65/EEC. Cf.
Directive 65/65/EEC, supra note 66, art. 4.
69 Council Directive 75/319/EEC, art. 8, 1975 O.J. (L 147) 13 [hereinafter
Directive 75/319/EEC]. Importantly, "the responsibility of [the CPMP] shall be to
examine . . .the questions referred to it by a Member State .... ." Id. art. 8, § 2
(emphasis added). The focus, then, remained on the impetus of national action,
not international action.
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approval procedure that was based on mutual recognition of
authorizations granted by one Member State's regulatory authority
(the "CPMP procedure").
70
Directive 75/319/EEC envisioned that the CPMP procedure
would streamline the approval process for drugs intended for
marketing throughout Europe. It provided that once a marketing
authorization was obtained in one Member State, the applicant
could simultaneously apply for reciprocal approval in five or more
additional Member States by requesting that the regulatory
authority of the nation of first approval forward copies of the
application, via the CPMP, to -their counterparts in the other
Member States. 71 However, this procedure, the first of its kind in
Europe, was very unpopular with the industry and was seldom
used.72 One reason for this unpopularity was the inability of the
applicant company to access the rudimentary dispute resolution
mechanism provided in the procedure.73
In response to the failure of the CPMP procedure, a modified
version was introduced in 1983 (the "multistate procedure"). 74 The
multistate procedure was very similar to its predecessor but had
two significant differences: (1) the minimum number of Member
States asked to recognize the initial approval was reduced to two,
and (2) applicant companies were given direct access to the CPMP
if a dispute arose.75  Despite these modifications, the
pharmaceutical industry still remained wary and failed to utilize
the procedure on a large scale. 76
70 Id. arts. 9-14.
71 Id. art. 9. Although a central body was forwarding the application, this, in
itself, could not be called meaningful harmonization since it was no different than
if the applicant company had submitted five additional applications to each of
those nations from the beginning.
72 See ABRAHAM & LEWIS, supra note 27, at 85-86 (discussing the details and
results of the "CPMP procedure").
73 See Directive 75/319/EEC, supra note 69 art. 12 (providing that the CPMP
would hear any dispute brought to it by a Member State). If a Member State took
exception to another Member State's refusal to recognize its marketing
authorization, the CPMP could be consulted by those nations to render a non-
binding opinion. However, no provisions were made to permit the applicant
company to access the CPMP.
74 Council Directive 83/570/EEC, art. 3, 1983 O.J. (L 332) 1 [hereinafter
Directive 83/570/EEC].
75 See id. (referring to the "holder of the marketing authorization" and
providing for direct contact with the CPMP).
76 See ABRAHAM & LEWIS, supra note 27, at 86-87 (discussing the details and
results of the "multistate procedure").
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The most significant problem with both the CPMP procedure
and the multistate procedure was the inability of an applicant to
reliably acquire reciprocal approval from additional Member States
based on the approval by the initial reviewing agency.77 Given this
failure of the mutual recognition principle, these procedures did
not offer any real advantage over the traditional method of
obtaining individual approvals from each nation separately. Large
transnational pharmaceutical companies typically maintained a
staff in each target country with expertise in the procedures, laws,
and nuances of that country's drug approval process. 78 Turning
instead to a supranational pan-European process neutralized this
expertise, and despite the potential cost savings of eliminating
these employees, the failure to reliably obtain reciprocal approvals
made these procedures very unappealing.
In conjunction with the introduction of the multistate
procedure, a separate procedure was instated in 1987 for the
approval of certain pharmaceutical products. The so-called
"concertation" procedure instituted by Council Directive
87/22/EEC governed certain products defined as "high-
technology" products, namely products derived from cutting edge
biotechnology.79 Like the multistate procedure, the concertation
procedure began with an application to a national regulatory
authority, called, in this case, the rapporteur. 80 However, unlike
The lowering of the minimum number of Members States from which an
applicant was required to- seek reciprocal approval in order to utilize the
procedure was presumably instituted to try to popularize the use of the
procedure. It is interesting to note that despite this reduction, the average number
of nations included in such applications ;actually grew. Id. This indicates that
pharmaceutical companies were in search of a procedure that would strengthen
their ability to win reciprocal approvals in other Member States, a procedure of
grander scale rather than the smaller scale of the multistate procedure.
77 Id.
78 See id. at 86 ("One of the reasons we might expect industry to welcome
mutual recognition is because it allows companies to submit applications without
the need for regulatory staff in every country concerned, reducing costs and
(possibly) speeding up the approval process.").
79 Council Directive 87/22/EEC, 1987 O.J. (L 15) 38 [hereinafter Directive
87/22/EEC]. The types of products encompassed by the concertation procedure
included those developed through the use of "recombinant DNA technology,
controlled expression of genes coding for biologically active proteins . . . [or]
hybridoma and monoclonal antibody methods." Id. Annex A. These methods
have become increasingly prevalent in biomanufacturing.
80 Id. art. 3. However, unlike the multistate procedure, regulatory authorities
were in some cases required to refer applications to the CPMP even if not
requested to do so by the applicant company. See id. art. 2, § 2 (requiring referral
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the multistate procedure, the rapporteur acted essentially as an
agent of the EU and not solely on behalf of its national
government. Copies of all application materials were to be
supplied to the CPMP immediately after their receipt by the
rapporteur.81  The CPMP opinion then acted essentially as a
marketing authorization for all Member States concerned.S2 Member
States were then required to seek another CPMP opinion if they
wished to deny marketing authorization. 83 It is important to note,
however, that the CPMP's final opinion was not ultimately binding
on Member States under the concertation procedure; a Member
State could legally choose to set aside the CPMP opinion in favor
of a different national position.84
The fate of the concertation procedure was ultimately the same
as that of the multistate procedure in that both were eventually
replaced. However, the concertation procedure was changed in a
less fundamental manner when compared to the substantial reform
of the multistate procedure. The obvious reason for this was that
the concertation procedure experienced a good deal of success
during its lifetime.. Marketing authorizations granted by the
rapporteur and approved by the CPMP were consistently
respected by other Member States, and few cases arose where a
Member State refused to abide by the CPMP opinion.
85
Explaining the success of the concertation procedure as
compared to its contemporary, the multistate procedure, offers the
first glimpse into what elements are required for successful
international harmonization. 86 The key difference between the two
to the CPMP for some products governed by Directive 87/22/EEC, primarily
those developed through the use of genetic manipulation). This signaled the
intention of the EU to regulate certain types of technology at least somewhat on a
supranational level.
81 Id. art. 3.
82 See id. art. 2, § 4 (requiring consultation of the CPMP before "withdrawal or
. . . suspension of the marketing authorization" if the CPMP had rendered a
"favourable opinion on [marketing authorization]"). This essentially indicated
that a favorable CPMP opinion amounted to an effective authorization that then
had to be withdrawn or suspended in order to prevent the product from being
sold.
83 Id.
84 Directive 87/22/EEC only requires that if a Member State wishes to deny
marketing approval despite a second favorable CPMP opinion, it must notify the
CPMP of its decision to do so within thirty days. Id. art. 4, § 4.
85 ABRAHAM & LEWIS, supra note 27, at 97.
86 It could alternatively be argued that the disparity in success was not due to
any characteristic of either procedure but rather differences in the types of
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is the level of centralization, particularly the level of involvement
by the CPMP. The multistate procedure effectively operated
independent of the CPMP. A company seeking marketing
authorization for a drug would apply to a national regulatory
authority acting purely on behalf of its national government alone.
If an authorization was granted, two or more other national
agencies were asked to recognize the first nation's authorization,
which was granted in a review process they were not originally
privy to. The decision to recognize the first nation's authorization
was left to the reviewing nation's discretion. This process enabled
the reviewing nation to consider its own national priorities in
deciding whether or not to recognize another country's
authorization. The CPMP only became involved in the event of a
dispute; the applicant company could petition for the CPMP to
intervene. However, the CPMP had no authority to forcefully
perturb any Member State's national regulatory authority.8 7
In contrast, the concertation procedure was a far more
centralized process. The rapporteur acted on behalf of the entire
EU. Every concerned Member State's regulators were involved in
the approval process via the CPMP. Any objections were
discussed at the level of the CPMP prior to any grant of marketing
authorization. This collective process culminated in an opinion
promulgated by the CPMP, albeit ultimately non-binding.
The importance of centralization was recognized in 1993 as the
EU took the next step toward true harmonization across the
European zone. The multistate and concertation procedures were
revamped to become the decentralized and centralized procedures
products governed by each. However, nothing inherent in the nature of the
products governed by the concertation procedure indicates that they would
present lesser concerns of safety, efficacy, or quality as compared to products
governed by the multistate procedure. In fact, given that many of the concertation
procedure products were highly innovative, they could be said to pose greater
potential risks given the relative lack of experience with such technology.
Political and economic concerns would also be just as, if not more likely, to trigger
resistance for the products governed by the concertation procedure given the
controversial nature of many new biotechnologies such as genetic engineering.
87 Member States legally had to give "due consideration" to the marketing
authorization issued by another Member State. Directive 83/570/EEC, supra note
74, art. 3. However, this certainly fell well short of requiring mutual recognition
or providing the CPMP with any effective legal grounds or authority to force
Member States to capitulate. In fact, the only requirement made of Member States
when faced with an adverse CPMP opinion was to notify the CPMP within sixty
days of their decision whether or not to abide by the opinion. Id.
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respectively. 88 In addition, a new EU-level agency, the EMEA, was
established with the CPMP as its scientific arm.89 Lastly, stricter
guidelines governing the timetable for reviewing applications were
instituted, a move roughly concurrent with similar changes in
Europe's major national regulatory agencies. 90
The centralized procedure, the technical successor to the
concertation procedure, has two important new features. First,
applications are no longer made to a national regulatory agency
acting as rapporteur but are instead submitted directly to the
EMEA.91 Second, and more importantly, the EMEA/CPMP's final
decision regarding an application is now binding on all Member
States.92  The EMEA/CPMP has thus become the ultimate
regulatory authority for the entire EU with respect to applications
under the centralized procedure. Still, while this change is not an
unimportant one, its significance is somewhat muted in that the
CPMP for all practical purposes held this role under the
concertation procedure in effect if not in name.93
In contrast, the decentralized procedure is markedly different
88 See Council Directive 93/39/EEC, 1993 O.J. (L 214) 22 (amending the
multistate procedure to create the new decentralized procedure); Council
Regulation 2309/93, 1993 O.J. (L 214) 1 (replacing the concertation procedure with
the centralized procedure).
The term decentralized procedure is a descriptive term (like the previously
introduced terms CPMP procedure, multistate procedure, and concertation procedure)
adopted for the purposes of this Comment due to its value in distinguishing its
characteristics from the centralized procedure. The decentralized procedure,
however, is actually a more centralized version of its immediate predecessor, the
multistate procedure. Along with the term mutual recognition procedure, which
refers to the decentralized procedure, these are the common labels used in
scholarship. See, e.g., ABRAHAM & LEwIs, supra note 27, at 88, 97 (utilizing these
terms).
89 Council Regulation 2309/93, supra note 88, tit. 4.
96 See Council Directive 93/39/EEC, supra note 88, art. 3, § 1 (setting strict
time limits for the decentralized procedure); Council Regulation 2309/93, supra
note 88, tit. 2, ch. 1 (setting strict time limits for the centralized procedure,
including a 210 day limit for issuance of the CPMP opinion after receipt of an
application); cf. supra Section 3.1 (discussing the recent trend of European agencies
reducing review times).
91 See Council Regulation 2309/93, supra note 88, tit. 1, art. 4, § I ("In order to
obtain the authorization . . . [the applicant] shall submit an application to the
European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products ["EMEA"I.....").
92 Id. tit. 2, art. 12, §§ 1-2. In fact, the decision is binding on all Member
States, not just those specifically targeted by the applicant, even if the applicant
does not intend to sell the product in all Member States.
93 See discussion, supra pp. 172-74 (describing the concertation procedure).
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from its nominal predecessor, the multistate procedure. The basic
mechanism for action is the same; companies must still first apply
for and obtain a marketing authorization in one Member State.94
The applicant then requests mutual recognition of that
authorization from additional countries and forwards the original
application sent to the nation of first approval to other Member
States along with a copy of the authorization. 95 However, should a
Member State refuse reciprocal approval and the disagreement
cannot be resolved via negotiation, the matter is referred for
arbitration before the CPMP.96 More importantly, the decision of
the CPMP is binding on the Member States involved.97
The magnitude of this change should not be underestimated.
Practically speaking, the result of the decentralized procedure has
been the near eradication of disputes regarding mutual recognition
as measured by referrals for CPMP arbitration. 98 The pressure for
Member States to conform and recognize the marketing
authorizations of other Member States is enormous and comes
from several sources.
First, due to strict time limits prescribed for each phase of the
process, regulators are hard-pressed to gather the materials
necessary to adequately support a decision to reject an application
for mutual recognition. 99
Second, the prospect of an adverse CPMP decision acts as a
deterrent. No national regulatory agency savors the possibility of
its authority being overruled by a binding CPMP decision.
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the new European
94 Council Directive 93/39/EEC, supra note 88, art. 3, § 1 (revising, inter alia,
Article 9 of Directive 75/319/EEC).
95 Id.
96 Id. (revising Article 10 of Directive 75/319/EEC). Member States involved
in the dispute and the applicant company "shall use their best endeavours to
reach agreement ...... Id. If those negotiations fail, however, arbitration is
mandatory. Id.
97 Each Member State concerned is now required to conform with the
decision of their regulatory authority with that of the CPMP within thirty days of
adoption by the European Commission. Id.
98 As of 2002, arbitration referrals arising out of the mutual recognition
procedure have never numbered in the double digits in any given year, with a
peak of nine in 2002 to bring, the total to thirty-two since the procedure's
inception. See EMEA, EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT § 2.5 (2002) at 16-17 and
accompanying tbl. (marking an increase in arbitration referrals in 2002), available
at http://www.emea.eu.int/pdfs/general/direct/emeaar/005502en.pdf.
99 ABRAHAM & LEWIS, supra note 27, at 91.
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regulatory regime encourages an atmosphere of competition
among agencies. Pharmaceutical companies understandably
choose a nation of first approval very carefully. It is obviously in
their best interest to select an agency that is most likely to approve
their drugs as quickly and efficiently as possible. In addition, they
are unlikely to select an agency that refused to grant reciprocal
approval in a previous application for mutual recognition. Given
that virtually all European agencies in medicines regulation now
depend to some degree on fees collected from pharmaceutical
companies, the financial pressure to attract as many applicants as
possible is extremely high 100
3.3. Lessons of the European Harmonization Effort
Several salient points emerge from the examination of
European harmonization efforts to date. First and foremost, the
influence of the pharmaceutical industry has been enormous and
omnipresent. The current trend in national medicines regulation in
Europe is reform favoring the interests of the industry, most
notably in the form of reducing the length of drug review times
and increasing consultations with the industry.
Furthermore, industry influence is unlikely to wane for the
foreseeable future since it is being built into the structure of
national medicines regulation. The MCA is not the only agency
supported wholly, or in part, by industry user fees. The MPA is
also entirely supported by industry fees,101 and even historically
reluctant German regulators now supplement the BfArM budget
with user fees.102
The influence of industry has been powerful in the
development of supranational regulation in Europe as well. In
fact, the replacement of the multistate procedure (and concertation
procedure) came upon the heels of a series of recommendations
issued by the Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry
("ABPI") in 1988.103 Virtually all of the reforms recommended by
100 See discussion infra Section 3.3.
101 SWEDISH MEDICAL PRODUCTS AGENCY, MAKING LIFE A LrrrLE SAFER 1 (n.d.),
available at http://www.mpa.se/eng/about_mpa/MPA-pres-en.pdf (last
updated Jan. 10, 2002).
102 See ABRAHAM & LEWIS, supra note 27, at 74 (discussing the partially fee-
based budget and retention of substantial government funding by the BfArM).
The BfArM is notable in that it retains substantial government funding. Id.
103 See id., at 87-88 (detailing the recommendations set out by the Association
of the British Pharmaceutical Industry ("ABPI") for the improvement of European
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
the ABPI were eventually enacted when the decentralized and
centralized procedures were installed. Therefore, it can be said
that the push for harmonization was effectively-and
successfully- instigated by industry.
Another key lesson of the European experience has been the
importance of strong centralization. The failure of the multistate
procedure (and the CPMP procedure before that) and the
subsequent success of the decentralized and centralized
procedures convincingly demonstrates the need for a powerful,
central organizing force in order to prevent national interests from
derailing harmonization. The converse is an important lesson as
well; without a meaningful central authority, divergent national
interests will eventually thwart harmonization efforts. This maxim
proved true in Europe and would be an even greater danger to
efforts at harmonizing regulations between more dissimilar
nations.
4. COMPARING THE ICH TO THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE
Even within its brief history, the ICH has shown considerable
promise in making international harmonization a reality.
However, despite the optimism in these early stages, an
examination of its work to date portends upcoming conflicts. The
parallels to the European experience are significant, and unique
factors brought into play by the involvement of the United States
and Japan will also enlarge obstacles to progress.
One crucial similarity with European harmonization is obvious
from a superficial glance at the organization of the ICH. The
parties to the ICH include the regulatory agencies of the three
participating nations,104 as well as the major associations of each
nation's pharmaceutical industry0 5 In addition, the ICH Secretariat
is run by the International Federation of Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Associations ("IFPMA"). 106 The influence of
harmonization efforts).
104 These are the U.S. FDA, the European Commission (namely, the EMEA),
and the Japanese Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare ("MHLW"). ICH GLOBAL
COOPERATION GROUP, ICH INFORMATION BROCHURE 6-8 (2001). Each agency's
scientific arm is thus also involved: CDER/CBER, the CPMP, and the Japanese
National Institute of Health Sciences ("NIHS").
105 These are PhRMA from the United States, the European Federation of
Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations ("EFPIA"), and the Japan
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association.("JPMA"). Id.
106 Id. at 8.
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industry concerns could not be more plain, and a closer analysis of
the ICH's output to date only reinforces this connection.
4.1. A Brief History of the ICH
The ICH was formed in Brussels, Belgium, at a meeting of the
interested parties hosted by the European Federation of
Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations ("EFPIA") in April of
1990.107 A Steering Committee was formed as well as Expert
Working Groups ("EWGs") assigned to specific "Topics." 108 These
Topics were subdivided into three categories: Quality, Safety, and
Efficacy. 109 Each Topic was, and continues to be, subject to a five-
step process concluding with implementation in each of the three
zones.1 0 Both the Steering Committee and the EWGs meet twice a
year at a location rotating between the three participating
nations."' In addition, a full ICH Conference is held every two
years and is attended by thousands of representatives of the six
parties as well as those of other interested parties; the most recent
conference was ICH6 held in Osaka, Japan in 2003.112
The accomplishments of the ICH have been impressive. Nearly
sixty ICH Topics have become official Guidelines and reached the
implementation stage as of 2003, meaning a harmonized text has
107 Id. at 4.
108 Id. at 4-5. This remains the mechanism through which the ICH operates.
A proposed Topic is first reviewed by the Steering Committee, then referred to an
EWG to work out the technical details. Id. at 14-16. The EWG reports back to the
Steering Committee periodically, and with its final recommendation, the Steering
Committee determines whether it should move forward to implementation. Id. at
16-17.
109 ICH, ICH Guidelines, at http://www.ich.org/TxtServer.jser?@_ID=250&
@_TEMPLATE=272 (last visited Feb. 22, 2005). A fourth category of Topics,
termed "Multidisciplinary" Topics, was formed to cover subject matter not well
suited for the original three categories. See id. (explaining that "Multidisciplinary
Topics" are "cross-cutting Topics which do not fit uniquely into one of the above
[three] categories.").
110 See ICH GLOBAL COOPERATION GROUP, supra note 104, at 14-18 (explaining
the five-step process for ICH Topics). The goal of the process is the formulation of
a harmonized text that is agreed upon by all of the parties. Theoretically, the final
step of implementation should be more or less a formality since each participating
regulatory agency has already agreed to the provisions of the harmonized text by
that point. However, as we shall see, implementation may not be quite so simple
if a politically or culturally sensitive subject is involved.
111 Id. at 4.
112 The previous five conferences were: ICH1 in Brussels (1991), ICH2 in
Orlando (1993), ICH3 in Yokohama (1995), ICH4 in Brussels (1997), and ICH5 in
San Diego (2000). Id. at 10.
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been approved by all parties, including all three regulatory
agencies.113 Many of these Guidelines pertain to uncontroversial
matters in which much international agreement already existed. 14
However, some represent meaningful progress in achieving
harmonization.
One simple example concerns the requirement of toxicity
testing. The Centre for Medicines Research ("CMR"), a U.K. based
group backed by the ABPI that has participated as an observer,
clashed with the FDA on the' length of toxicity testing to be
required for marketing approval. The CMR argued' that the
European standard of six months was adequate while the FDA
stood by its requirement of twelve months.115 After deliberation
and study by the ICH, the parties were able to compromise on a
harmonized Guideline that allowed for six month' studies in
rodents and nine month studies in non-rodents." 6
Perhaps the most significant new achievement of the ICH has
been the adoption of the Common Technical Document ("CTD"),
which is intended to serve as an acceptable alternate form for drug
marketing approval applications in all three jurisdictions. 117
Portions of the CTD have reached implementation in one or more
zones." 8 The long-term implications of the CTD merit closer
analysis as they begin to reveal the obstacles awaiting the ICH.
113 Id. app. 3, at 26-28.
114 See, e.g., Guideline on the Need-for Carcinogenicity Studies of Pharmaceuticals,
ICH Steering Committee, ICH Guideline SlA, at2 (Nov. 29, 1995) (describing the
historical background of the Guideline and the similarity amongst the parties'
previous requirements), available at http://www.emea.eu.int/pdfs/human/ich/
014095en.pdf.
115 See ABRAHAM & LEWIS, supra note 27, at 137-38 (recounting the toxicity
testing debate between the Centre for Medicines Research ("CMR") and the FDA).
Although a matter of a few months may not seem significant to the layperson, the
fastidiousness with which the FDA refused to alter its stance suggests this was not
a trivial issue.
116 See Duration of Chronic Toxicity Testing in Animals: Rodent and Non-Rodent
Toxicity Testing, ICH Steering Committee, ICH Guideline S4, at 2 (Sept. 2, 1998).
117 Organisation of the Common Technical Document for the Registration of
Pharmaceuticals for Human Use, ICH Steering Committee, ICH Guideline M4, at 1
(Nov. 8, 2000) [hereinafter CTD Organization].
118 See Status of the Common Technical Document Guidelines, at
http://www.ich.org/UrGrpServerjser?@_ID=1325&@_TEMPLATE=272 (last
updated Feb. 18, 2005) (listing the status of implementation efforts of the various
CTD guidelines).
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4.2. The Common Technical Document
The potential of the CTD in assisting harmonization efforts is
palpable. Cooperation between agencies would be aided if they all
received the necessary information organized in the same way.
More importantly, adoption of the CTD indicates a willingness of
all three agencies to: (1) require a common set of information for
marketing approval, (2) accept clinical research data from trials
performed on foreign soil, and (3) move toward some level of
mutual recognition.
The first of these possibilities is the most tangible at present.
While it is permitted for each agency to require additional
individualized documents - indeed, the first module of the CTD
explicitly calls for some degree of individualization19 - too much
deviation from the common form would ultimately defeat the
entire purpose of the CTD. If the CTD is to succeed, all three
agencies must commit to accepting basically the same set of
information. The critical benefit this presents to industry is a more
efficient and economical application process. Rather than
generating multiple different application forms, each of which
consists of hundreds of thousands of pages, a company need only
generate one document.
Acceptance of clinical research data from trials performed
abroad is a more dramatic leap from traditional practice.
However, it is a measure vital to accomplishing one of the ICH's
stated mission objectives, the elimination of unnecessary
duplicative clinical trials.120 Other ICH Guidelines have also
broached the subject.' 2 ' Together with the CTD, these Guidelines
reflect an overall commitment within the ICH to achieve
harmonization in this area. Indeed, implementation of this
objective in the three ICH zones has already begun in earnest.122
119 See CTD Organization, supra note 117, at 2 ("Module 1 is region specific.").
Module 1 consists primarily of administrative information.
120 See ICH GLOBAL COOPERATION GROUP, supra note 104, at 23 (stating the
ICH's objective to promote "more economical use of human... resources..."); cf.
supra Section 2.4 (discussing the elimination of duplicative clinical trials as a
rationale for international harmonization).
121 See, e.g., Ethnic Factors in the Acceptability of Foreign Clinical Data, ICH
Steering Committee, ICH Guideline E5, at 1 (Feb. 5, 1998) (stating as an objective,
"minimizing duplication of clinical studies")..
122 See ICH, Efficacy Guidelines (listing the status of implementation efforts
of the various Efficacy Guidelines), at http://www.ich.org/UrGrpServer.jser?@
_ID=475&@_TEMPLATE=272 (last visited Feb. 22, 2005).
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Furthermore, industry stands to benefit tremendously yet again.
Pharmaceutical companies will only need to conduct one series of
costly clinical trials per drug rather than an additional series for
each jurisdiction.
Mutual recognition would seem a logical next step. Assuming
the CTD effort achieves its goals, all three jurisdictions would be
using an essentially identical form and making assessments based
on identical data. The ICH has also worked to harmonize the
scientific requirements for marketing authorizations. 123 Although
the ICH has never explicitly declared mutual recognition to be a
goal, evidence for such a direction can be inferred from numerous
sources. The CTD effort itself can be interpreted to be an action in
furtherance of eventual mutual recognition.
Certainly the three parties representing the industry would
welcome such a move as they did in Europe. However, any
proposed mutual recognition regime must be a strong one because
a weak regime without strong central organization is bound to fail
as it did in Europe. Unfortunately, a number of factors complicate
the installation of a strong mutual recognition regime in the ICH
context.
4.3. Unique Difficulties Faced by the ICH Initiative
As seen in Europe, centralization is critical to the success of
mutual recognition. Unfortunately, disparities in national interests
between the participating nations of the ICH are in many ways
much larger than those found in' Europe. First and foremost, EU
nations were already heavily invested in broad-scale integration of
their legal, economic, and political systems through the EU. This
joint enterprise mitigates both desires to maintain national
sovereignty and conflicts between national interests. The United
States and Japan obviously are not as closely linked to each other
or to Europe. Thus, the importance of particular national interests
and the need for maintenance of national sovereignty are likely to
be more of a factor in the ICH than they were within the EU.
While the FDA, EMEA/CPMP, and MHLW have largely
proven themselves to be non-partisan agencies, the magnitude of a
123 Since all finalized Guidelines issued by the ICH Steering Committee are
texts agreed to by all of the parties', the bulk of the Quality, Safety, and Efficacy
Guidelines represent strides taken in harmonizing scientific requirements. For a
list of these Guidelines, see ICH GLOBAL COOPERATION GROUP, supra note 104, at
26-28.
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decision to adopt mutual recognition will almost certainly pique
the interests of at least some of their political overseers. Certain
specific cases are obvious causes for concern. The controversy in
the United States over the abortion debate and its questionably
linked offspring, the stem cell debate, will almost certainly cause
consternation at the FDA as it attempts to harmonize with Europe
and Japan. Another potential battleground is the current shouting
match over the use of genetically modified organisms ("GMOs"),
technology the United States has embraced but Europe opposes.
Each one is examined in turn with an eye toward the ICH and
harmonization in general.
4.3.1. The United States "Culture of Life" and Harmonization
The abortion debate in the United States continues to rage
decades after the landmark decisions in Roe v. Wade 24 and Planned
Parenthood v. Casey 25 extended constitutional protection to abortion
rights. As recently as in 2003, Congress has passed legislation
restricting abortion rights legislation signed by President George
W. Bush on November 5 of that year.126 President Bush, a
conservative Republican, has also promulgated a series of
Executive Orders and administrative actions that are seen as
limiting abortion rights.127 Clearly, the atmosphere in the United
124 See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S; 113 (1973) (holding that the U.S.
Constitution's protections of individual privacy extend to a woman's right to an
abortion, although in late stages' of pregnancy this right is balanced out by a
compelling state interest in protecting unborn children). The Roe Court proposed
a trimester scheme in which a woman's constitutional right to an abortion would
be tempered by some acceptable regulation by states in the latter trimesters. Id. at
145-49.
125 See generally Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (holding
that any measure that placed an "undue burden" on a woman's right to an
abortion is unconstitutional, rejecting the trimester scheme proposed under Roe v.
Wade).
126 Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2003). The Act renders
the performance of partial-birth abortions a federal crime punishable by up to two
years in prison. Id. § 1531(a). This legislation has been predictably challenged in
court and is certain to be granted Supreme Court review. A similar state law in
Nebraska was struck down in 2000 by the Supreme Court. See Stenberg v.
Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (holding that Nebraska's partial-birth abortion ban
was unconstitutional because it lacked an exception for cases in which the life of
the mother was threatened). However, proponents of the federal ban are more
hopeful since it provides that the ban "does not apply to a partial-birth abortion
that is necessary to save the life of a mother .. " 18 U.S.C. § 1531(a).
127 In fact, one of his very first actions as President after narrowly winning
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States for the sale of abortion drugs and related pharmaceutical
products is all but assured.
Attitudes in Europe toward abortion, though not uniform
either, are quite different from that of Americans. The differences
between Europe and the United States on this issue are exemplified
in the ongoing debate over RU-486, an oral abortion drug
developed in Europe and approved by the FDA in 2000.128 In late
2003, emboldened by the replacement of the pro-choice Clinton
Administration with the pro-life Bush Administration, Republican
Congressmen Jim DeMint and Roscoe Bartlett introduced a bill to
suspend RU-486's marketing authorization.129 In contrast, the drug
has been approved in much of Europe for over a decade and has
yet to see a significant challenge.
The stated basis for the DeMint-Bartlett bill is safety concerns
raised by the deaths of two American women that took RU-486.13
0
However, many pro-choice groups accuse them and President
Bush of using these few deaths as an excuse to pursue an unrelated
political agenda, namely undermining abortion rights.131 The
circumstances surrounding RU-486's -initial approval also show
marks of political involvement. 32
The abortion debate has also spawned a firestorm in the United
States over stem cell research. In August of 2001, President Bush
the 2000 election was the reimposition of the so-called global gag rule, which bans
federal funding for international groups that actively push abortion as a tool for
family planning. Robin Toner, The New Administration: The Abortion Issue, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 22, 2001, at A16. President Bush announced it as the first step in his
fight to create a "culture of life" in the United States. Id.
128 See Marc Kaufman, FDA Approves Abortion Pill: Family Planning Groups
Hail 'Milestone,' WASH. PosT, Sept. 29, 2000, at Al (reporting the FDA's approval of
RU-486 and the reactions of both supporters and opponents).
129 RU-486 Suspension and Review Act, H.R. 3453, 108th Cong. (2003). A
version is before the Senate as well. S. 1930, 108th Cong. (2003).
130 See Jeremy Manier, Teen's Death Rekindles Abortion Pill Battle, CHI. TRIB.,
Nov. 30, 2003, at C14 (discussing the death of Holly Patterson and its role in
sparking the movement in Congress to revoke RU-486's marketing authorization).
131 See id (reporting skepticism as to the motives behind the movement to
fight RU-486). These accusations are bolstered by comparable or more severe
fatality statistics for uncontroversial drugs. For example, 130 men died taking
Viagra in the eight months following its approval, a result that did not spark calls
for its withdrawal. Id.
132 See Sharon Bernstein, Persistence Brought Abortion Pill to U.S., L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 5, 2000, at Al (relating the lengthy, convoluted road that RU-486 took to
FDA approval and the possible involvement of the Clinton White House in easing
its passage).
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used one of his first primetime television appearances to address
the prickly issue of federal funding for embryonic stem cell
research. 133 The link to abortion is that the original sources of
embryonic stem cells are human embryos, and.harvesting the cells
terminates the embryos, which some pro-life advocates equate
with murder.134 President Bush did not seek to ban federal
funding altogether, but imposed tight restrictions that would end
the practice of embryonic stem cell harvesting.1
35
Unlike abortion, which ultimately touches on only a handful of
pharmaceutical products, stem cell research is often heralded as
the most exciting avenue of new therapy research in the twenty-
first century. President Bush's present policy only concerns the
federal funding of stem cell research. However, a wild stretch of
the imagination is not required to picture a conservative
administration or a conservative-controlled Congress injecting
itself into new drug approvals in the same way Congressmen
DeMint and Bartlett are attempting to do with RU-486.
These events lend little confidence that politically sensitive
issues like abortion or stem cell research will not affect the
behavior of American regulators and lawmakers. For example, if
an ICH mutual recognition system existed and a stem cell-based
drug approved in Europe sought reciprocal approval in the United
States, enormous political pressure could be applied to have it
rejected. It is an inauspicious sign indeed for the ICH if the success
of mutual recognition is dependent on which political party is in
control of the White House and/or Congress. Such -uncertainty
would undoubtedly make a pharmaceutical company think twice
before pursuing mutual recognition, especially considering the
133 Marc Sandalow, Bush Approves Strict Rules for Stem Cell Funding, S.F.
CHRON., Aug. 10, 2001, at Al.
134 See id. ("Members of the religious right, some of whom had equated stem
cell research to murder, were divided on the president's approach."); see also
Frank Bruni, Bush Gives His Backing for Limited Research on Existing Stem Cells, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 10, 2001, at Al (describing how President Bush's decision is keeping
him from "breaking a campaign pledge not to finance the destruction of what he
called live embryos").
135 Existing embryonic stem cell lines can be replicated indefinitely, but
President Bush's policy bans federal funding for research involving the gathering
of new stem cell lines from human embryos, even from embryos that would
otherwise be discarded in, for example, the process of in vitro fertilization. See
Bruni, supra note 134, at Al (" [President Bush] talked of the 'frozen embryos' in
fertility clinics .... But [he] did not ultimately permit federal financing of that.").
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public relations issues.136
4.3.2. Europe and the GMO Debate
In addition to the United States, other nations are being
affected by political concerns over biotechnology. For over a
decade now, the arguments have raged across the Atlantic over the
use of GMOs in agriculture. The FDA does not distinguish
between genetically modified crops -such as those transformed to
be resistant to certain pests-and crops that have never been
modified by biotechnology. 137 In fact, the full extent of genetic
modification in U.S. agriculture is essentially unknown since there
is no way to differentiate between GMO and non-GMO crops. 138
Unlike the United States, European nations have reacted quite
viscerally against the use of GMOs. Aside from the public uproar
raised by various advocacy groups,139 the impact of this difference
of opinion is evident in the chilling effect it has had on U.S.-Europe
trade in agricultural products. 40 Since U.S. food exports, for
example, are not labeled as having or not having been genetically
modified, the European reaction has been to avoid U.S. agricultural
products altogether. 141 If this trend continues, the damage to the
U.S. agriculture industry will be substantial.
While the GMO controversy has not to date spilled over into
the realm of pharmaceutical products, the potential certainly exists.
As mentioned earlier, genetic technology is becoming increasingly
prevalent in the pharmaceutical industry.142 Among the genetic
technologies frequently used is the genetic modification of animal
136 See Bernstein, supra note 132, at A24 (depicting the reluctance of
manufacturers to pursue FDA approval of RU-486 due to political and public
relations issues).
137 For an in-depth discussion of the GMO debate and its underpinnings, see,
for example, Kim Brooks, History, Change and Policy: Factors Leading to Current
Opposition to Food Biotechnology, 5 GEO. PUB. POL'Y REV. 153 (2000), and George E.C.
York, Global Foods, Local Tastes and Biotechnology: The New Legal Architecture of
International Agriculture Trade, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 423 (2001).
138 See Brooks, supra note 137, at 154 (noting Europe's opposition to
genetically modified crops).
139 See, e.g., Lim Li Ching, Institute of Science in Society, Keeping Europe GM-
Free, May 12, 2003, available at http:// www.i-sis.org.uk/KEGMF.php.
140 See York, supra note 137, at 427-28 (describing the steep declines in U.S.
agricultural exports to Europe following the GMO furor in the 1990s).
141 Brooks, supra note 137, at 154.
142 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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cells to induce them to produce certain compounds.143 While this
phenomenon has perhaps not been fully studied, the genetic
manipulation of animals raises many of the same concerns as that
of plants, particularly the ecological and long-term medical
impacts of such manipulation.144 It may just be a matter of time
before attention shifts to the use of biotechnology in
pharmaceutical development, as it has in the United States.
The EU is currently reviewing measures that would, among
other things, require labeling of GMO products and impose other
restrictions on the ability of U.S. food manufacturers to sell their
goods in Europe. 45 If this sort of approach was applied to what
European consumers considered to be objectionable
pharmaceutical products, the success of the mutual recognition
principle as it applied to GMO-based products from the United
States and Japan would be in grave peril.
4.3.3. The Potential Hazard of Politics
The danger of these controversies with regard to the ICH is that
political sensitivities, which are more pronounced across oceans
than within Europe, could lead to each Party reserving the right to
enact measures against particular pharmaceutical products based
on political concerns rather than issues of quality, safety, or
efficacy. However, such a scheme would be sure to fail due to
industry disapproval. Given the uncertainty of politics, industry is
likely to be uninterested in using a procedure vulnerable to
political whims, thus resulting in a failure much like that suffered
by the CPMP and multistate procedures in Europe. 146
143 See, e.g., Brandon Price & Stephanie Finnegan, Biomanufacturing Strategies:
Protein-Production Planning in a Resource-Constrained Environment, CoNTRACT
PHARMA, Nov. 2000, available at http://www.contractpharma.com/novO01.htm
(discussing the use of genetic technology in pharmaceutical manufacturing).
144 See York, supra note 137, at 433 (describing the concerns that GMOs may
have negative long-term effects on human health, such as unintended allergic or
toxic effects, and on ecosystems).
145 For a discussion of some of these proposals and their potential impact on
U.S.-Europe relations vis-a-vis the WTO, see Joanne Scott, European Regulation of
GMOs and the WTO, 9 COLUM. J. EuR. L. 213 (2003).
146 After all, the traditional approach of obtaining individual approvals in
each zone would remain available. The lesson of the European experience was
that pharmaceutical companies are reluctant to substantially revamp their
operating procedures without confidence in the reliability of the alternative
harmonized procedure. See discussion supra Section 3.2. (suggesting lack of
reliability as the reason pharmaceutical companies did not adopt the CPMP and
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Unfortunately, it is difficult to imagine the United States
permitting Europe to set any de facto American regulatory policy
pertaining to abortion or even stem cell research. Likewise, the EU
is likely to resist American fiat on GMO-based products as it has
been for a decade with regard to agricultural products. The
involvement of Japan further complicates the picture as a third
nation with national interests that have historically been even more
unique and different.
5. KEY CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF THE ICH
The key conflict that the ICH is likely to face is that between
industry concerns and national interests. As discussed above, the
ICH is, to a significant extent, beholden to industry interests.
147
This is very similar to European harmonization efforts, which
resulted in the current highly centralized, industry-friendly
system.148 However, the ICH faces more significant obstacles to
centralization than the EU system.149 So can these obstacles be
overcome?
The European experience made clear the consequences of a
weak, decentralized regulatory regime. Industry will not make use
of a system of mutual recognition without reliable rates of
reciprocal approval.150  Without centralization, reliability is
uncertain if not unlikely based on the dismal failures of the CPMP
and multistate procedures in Europe. Therefore, the ICH must
adopt guidelines favoring accountability and centralization in the
model of the European system if mutual recognition is to succeed.
Given that the ICH has yet to embrace mutual recognition as a
goal, one might wonder whether it even needs to traverse such
potentially contentious ground to be a success. However, without
mutual recognition, the ultimate worth of the ICH is limited,
perhaps even marginal. The pharmaceutical industry, having
experienced the benefits of mutual recognition in Europe, will
continue to espouse it as a priority and will not be satisfied with
multistate procedures).
147 See discussion supra Section 3.3 (noting the influence of the industry).
148 See discussion supra Section 3.2 (describing the evolution of European
drug regulations harmonization).
149 See discussion supra Section 4.3 (discussing the difficulties facing the ICH
that did not arise during European harmonization efforts).
150 See discussion supra Section 3.2-.3 (examining the motivations and goals of
the industry with regard to drug regulations harmonization).
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what currently amounts to harmonization of administrative
minutiae as compared to the momentous reform represented by
mutual recognition. The commitment of the industry in winning
an effective mutual recognition regime was evident in Europe.
Given the industry's influence on the ICH and on medicines
regulation in general, a reckoning over the issue is probably
unavoidable whether it comes during or after the lifetime of the
ICH project.
Is sufficient centralization of pharmaceutical regulation
possible then under the auspices of the ICH? Is the ICH effort
doomed to fail due to insurmountable obstacles? Unfortunately
this is a real possibility, at least given the current state of world
affairs. As already noted, the national interests of the three parties
may not be fully compatible with a strong central regulatory
regime modeled after that of Europe.151
However, the political power of the industry should not be
discounted. Although the impediments to harmonization in the
ICH context are greater than those that faced the EU, reasons
certainly exist to believe that industry concerns are up to the task
of overcoming these challenges.
In the United States, the FDA budget has been partially
comprised by industry user fees since the passage of the
Prescription Drug User Fee Act ("PDUFA") in 1992.152 Although
the proportion of the FDA's funding made up of user fees is
currently relatively small, the legal framework for potentially
greater FDA ties to the industry was established by PDUFA. In
addition, the pharmaceutical industry remains one of the most
powerful lobbies in the United States. 5 3
In sum, in order for the ICH to truly fulfill its potential, all
three regulatory agencies -the FDA, the EMEA, and the MHLW -
must be willing to subordinate individual political sensitivities to
the greater purpose of international harmonization. A strongly
centralized mutual recognition regime is an essential component
for successful international harmonization, and all parties to the
ICH must accept that fact. Although current circumstances
perhaps make this development premature, some cause for
151 See discussion supra Section 4.3 (describing examples of large disparities in
national interests).
152 21 U.S.C. § 379g-h (1992).
153 See discussion supra note 17 (assessing the strength of the U.S. industry
lobby in healthcare).
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optimism exists in the continuing strength of the industry lobby,
which has shown itself to be sufficiently potent to push forward
harmonization efforts to date.
6. CONCLUSION
The ICH is a truly exciting step forward in the harmonization
movement. The global scale of the pharmaceutical and health care
industries makes international harmonization of medicines
regulation a necessity. Decreasing R&D costs, reducing drug lag,
improving inter-agency cooperation and efficiency, and
eliminating duplicative clinical trials are vital to ensure the health
and continued growth of the pharmaceutical industry, which is
saddled with one of the heaviest regulatory burdens of any
industry. The ICH and international harmonization as a whole
represent an exceptionally promising road to these goals.
In addition, society as a whole stands to gain from these
propositions. International harmonization could lead to significant
reductions in healthcare costs and drug prices. Such a
development could improve healthcare not only in regions such as
those represented in the ICH but also in the developing world.
Moreover, international harmonization could certainly facilitate
even greater strides in pharmaceutical science, and dreaded
diseases could be swept away at an unprecedented pace.
However, although these grand visions are appealing,
enthusiasm for international harmonization and its pioneer, the
ICH, must be tempered with pragmatism. Europe's experience
with drug regulation harmonization provides key insights that
must be heeded if international harmonization is to succeed. A
harmonized regulatory system like the one the ICH seeks to
implement must present the industry with a choice superior to the
current regime. In all likelihood, mutual recognition must be the
foundation on which the harmonized system is based. In order to
ensure the success of mutual recognition in the international arena,
a sufficiently centralized scheme must be put into place with a
strong central international authority.
Cause for pessimism certainly exists. Political and economic
concerns will almost surely erect hurdles to the success of the ICH.
Since these hurdles strike at the very principle of mutual
recognition itself, the prospects of a strongly centralized
international regulatory regime modeled after the EU system seem
clouded. As the EU experience indicates, less robust schemes may
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be doomed to failure.
Some hope can be seen, however, in the strong influence the
industry wields in the development of drug regulation. This
influence has been pronounced not only in Europe but in the
United States as well, and developments in the near future may
show the Japanese pharmaceutical industry starting to flex its
muscle. Combined, these industry voices constitute an extremely
powerful bloc, the importance of which is clear from its central role
in the ICH. If recent history is indicative of the future, the eventual
success of international harmonization is all but guaranteed. Still,
successful international harmonization may not arrive in the form
of the ICH since current concerns may prove too formidable at the
present time.
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